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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S SOCIAL SECURITY
RULES WILL HARM INNOVATION IN THE ASSISTIVE
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY AND PEOPLE WITH
DISABILITIES
Christopher Buccafusco† & Mariel Talmage*

The following essay was adapted from the authors’ comment submitted in
opposition to the Trump Administration’s Proposed Rules Regarding the Frequency
and Notice of Continuing Disability Reviews.

The Trump Administration recently proposed changes to the rules
governing disability benefits administered by the Social Security
Administration (SSA).1 The proposed rules are projected to cause many
current recipients of government benefits to lose an important source of
income.2 This essay draws attention to an enormous, but previously
unrecognized, cost of the proposed rules. By diminishing payments to
people with disabilities, the proposed rules threaten the growth of the

† Professor of Law, Director of the Intellectual Property Program, and Associate Dean for
Faculty Development, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
* J.D. Candidate (May 2021), Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
1 Rules Regarding the Frequency and Notice of Continuing Disability Reviews, 84 Fed. Reg.
63588 (proposed Nov. 18, 2019) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 416).
2 See id. at 63596 (describing the expected loss of benefits and other costs to the public).
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multi-billion dollar assistive technology industry.3 This industry, which
represents thousands of patents worth of innovative activity, is predicted
to reach $31 billion by 2024 and to grow at 7.4% annually.4 But those
numbers are put at risk if consumers are unable to purchase assistive
technologies because they do not receive s Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits.
The Social Security Administration Act establishes several
categories of government benefits based on the recipient’s disability,
including SSI5 and SSDI.6 A series of statutes and implementing
regulations in the 1980s established a review process for the Social
Security Administration to periodically assess whether people with
disabilities receiving these payments still meet statutory eligibility
criteria.7 The SSA determines the frequency of Continuing Disability
Reviews (CDRs), either through a full medical review or a less-intensive
mailer review, based on an assessment of the recipient’s likelihood of
medical improvement, categorized into three Medical Improvement
Diaries.8 The Medical Improvement Expected category is for recipients
whose conditions are likely to improve such that they can again engage
in substantial gainful activity, and typically involves a CDR every six to
eighteen months.9 The Medical Improvement Possible category is
assigned to all other disabilities that might improve, and involves a CDR
at least every three years.10 Finally, the Medical Improvement Not
Expected category includes disabilities that are not likely to improve or
are likely to progressively worsen, and involves a CDR every five to
seven years.11
The proposed amendments to the SSA’s regulations add a new
medical improvement diary: Medical Improvement Likely, which
imposes a CDR every two years.12 More than four million current
recipients of SSDI or SSI will fall into this category should the rules be

3 Assistive Technology Market Estimates: Rapid Growth Ahead, BUREAU OF INTERNET
ACCESSIBILITY (Aug. 8, 2019, 10:33 AM), https://www.boia.org/blog/assistive-technologymarket-estimates-rapid-growth-ahead [https://perma.cc/4L5J-PW4D].
4 Id.
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1385 (2018).
6 Id. §§ 401–434.
7 Rules Regarding the Frequency and Notice of Continuing Disability Reviews, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 63588–89 (discussing amendments to the Social Security Act in 1980, 1983, and 1984, and the
SSA’s promulgation of regulations in 1986).
8 Id. at 63589–90; see 42 U.S.C. § 421(i); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1590, 416.990 (2019).
9 Rules Regarding the Frequency and Notice of Continuing Disability Reviews, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 63589.
10 Id. at 63589–90.
11 Id. at 63590.
12 Id.
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adopted.13 The SSA also proposed revisions to the existing diary
categories to acknowledge advances in testing and treatment for different
conditions.14 The SSA estimates that increasing the frequency of CDRs
through these changes will result in a net reduction of $2 billion in Old
Age, Survivor’s, and SSDI payments, and a reduction of $0.6 billion in
SSI payments between fiscal years 2020 and 2029.15
These proposed changes by the Social Security Administration will
cause many people with disabilities to lose their SSI or SSDI benefits. 16
The proposals are based on the assumption that an increased frequency
of CDRs will reduce the SSA’s expenditures and improve reemployment
of those who lose their benefits sooner than they would under the current
rules.17 This justification is tenuous at best—by the SSA’s own
admission, its past experience suggests that many of those who lose
benefits do not return to the workforce at a Substantial Gainful Activity
(SGA) level.18 Further, a causal link between a shorter duration of
receiving benefits and improved work outcomes has not been
established.19 Therefore, the more frequent and burdensome CDRs will
leave many current beneficiaries without benefits despite their inability

13 See Sarah Kim, Trump Administration’s Proposed Disability Benefits Policy Change Will
Hurt Thousands of Americans, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2019, 1:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
sarahkim/2019/12/17/trump-administrations-proposed-ssdi-policy-change/#4a22a66b4abe
[https://perma.cc/X4DL-NR3Y].
14 Rules Regarding the Frequency and Notice of Continuing Disability Reviews, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 63592.
15 Id. at 63596.
16 See id.
17 Id. at 63590–91, 63596–97.
18 See id. at 63591. (“Overall, about 22 percent [of beneficiaries and recipients whose benefits
terminated due to a 1997 statutory change] returned to work at an SGA level during the first three
years . . . . [I]n 2013, 35.5 percent of the 40-year-old adults who had been out of the work force for
1 year returned to work at an SGA level. The percentage of the 40-year-olds who returned to work
at an SGA level dropped to 27.1 percent after 2 years out of the work force, 17 percent after 3 years,
and to only 7.4 percent after 7 years. In the same year, 30.7 percent of the 50-year-old adults out of
the work force for 1 year returned to work at an SGA level, 23.5 percent after 2 years, 14 percent
after 3 years, and only 5.5 percent after 7 years out of the work force.”); see also Lowell Arye,
Trump Seeks to Bring Back Social Security Rule Changes, One of Reagan’s Worst Ideas, HILL (Jan.
27, 2020, 6:30 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/480182-trump-seeks-tobring-back-social-security-rule-changes-one-of [https://perma.cc/564K-SMGS] (“SSA research
shows that 22 percent of individuals returned to the workforce during the first three years following
benefit termination. More significantly, it also shows that 78 percent of individuals did NOT return
to the workforce during the first three years following termination from the rolls. Without their
benefits, these individuals are left with no means of supporting themselves.”).
19 Rules Regarding the Frequency and Notice of Continuing Disability Reviews, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 63591 (“Although the data shows a modest correlation between the length of time outside of the
workforce and likelihood of reentering at an SGA level, the data does not provide evidence of
causality between the two.”).
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to work, with devastating impacts on individuals who rely on these
benefits to cover food, medical care, and housing costs.20
But there is another, less obvious impact of the proposed rule: the
expected loss of benefits will threaten the progress of design innovation
for accessible technologies, to the detriment of disabled and nondisabled
people, as well as to the businesses and entrepreneurs who create and sell
these technologies.
For over a century and a half, government-support payments to
people with disabilities have been important drivers of innovation in
accessible design.21 The needs and preferences of people with disabilities
have spurred innovations in artificial limbs, wheelchairs, vehicles,
software, electronics, and the built environment.22 But people with
disabilities often lack the wealth to purchase new technologies. There is
a long history of social welfare payments, which include the SSI and
SSDI payments subject to the proposed rule, driving design innovation.23
These types of benefits give people with disabilities who may be unable
to work or unable to work full time the buying power to create demand
for a wide variety of assistive technologies.24 This demand incentivizes
firms to develop and produce better products.25 Moreover, these design
innovations have wide benefits to people with and without disabilities.26
An early example of social welfare payments driving design
innovation is improvements to artificial limbs spurred by payments to

20 See Arye, supra note 18 (comparing the proposed rules to similar Reagan Administration
policies that left people with disabilities unable to provide for themselves and in some cases led to
their deaths).
21 Christopher Buccafusco, Disability and Design, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3497902; see also BETH LINKER, WAR’S
WASTE: REHABILITATION IN WORLD WAR I AMERICA 98–100 (2011).
22 Buccafusco, supra note 21.
23 Id. (manuscript at 9–14, 47, 49–50).
24 Id.; AIMI HAMRAIE, BUILDING ACCESS: UNIVERSAL DESIGN AND THE POLITICS OF
DISABILITY 51 (2017) (“Following the Civil War, the U.S. federal government offered subsidies
for the invention and manufacture of artificial limbs for soldiers, creating a marketplace for new
innovations in prosthetics. As the new technologies proliferated, inventors advertised their products
by claiming their authority to know and make these devices.”); see also BESS WILLIAMSON,
ACCESSIBLE AMERICA: A HISTORY OF DISABILITY AND DESIGN 34 (2019) (describing the
innovation-boosting effect of automobile subsidies to disabled World War II veterans).
25 Buccafusco, supra note 21 (manuscript at 9–15, 47, 49–50).
26 Id. (manuscript at 45) (“To the extent that many patented innovations for disabled access
may be narrowly tailored to a specific need, they are likely to be most beneficial to disabled people
themselves. It is possible, however, that nondisabled people may obtain various positive
externalities either because the invention turns out to be useful for them as well, or because the
invention unlocks a stream of research that produces other products that will be valuable for
nondisabled users.”); see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV
839, 850–59 (2008) (describing the many positive externalities that nondisabled people receive
from accommodations for people with disabilities).
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veterans.27 Prior to the Civil War, artificial limbs were expensive,
custom-made wooden pieces made to order by artisans.28 Following the
Civil War, amputee veterans received “limb allowances,” and by the end
of World War I the government had invested in artificial limb
development itself.29 Government pensions and allowances for Civil War
and World War I veterans allowed more people to be able to afford these
devices, and firms responded by investing in innovations to take artificial
limb from a prohibitively expensive bespoke creation to a mass-produced
and affordable technology.30 Once able to access these devices, veterans
were better equipped to re-enter the workforce, providing for their
families and contributing to the economy.
Later, subsidies to World War II veterans to purchase cars modified
to be driven by veterans who had lost one or both legs drove demand for
accessible automobiles.31 Buick Motor Company responded with a
version of its Reliant automobile that radically transformed mobility for
veterans. These subsidies were instrumental to getting veterans who
benefitted from them back into the workforce.32 However, these subsidies
were short-lived, and once the subsidy program ended, the innovations
all but disappeared.33 The story of the post-war automobile subsidies
starkly illustrates how important government benefits are in creating and
sustaining demand for technological innovations.
These days, people with disabilities may use their SSI and SSDI
benefits to purchase a broad range of assistive technologies that improve
their lives immeasurably. These technologies, which often are not
covered by insurance, include specialized wheelchairs for work and for
leisure, artifacts for modifying their offices and their homes, and
thousands of other products that improve users’ health, happiness, and

27 HAMARAIE, supra note 24, at 51; LINKER, supra note 21, at 98 (“The boom years for US
prosthetic manufacturing began during the Civil War, when the Union incentivized limb production
by giving its 35,000 amputee-veterans a ‘limb allowance’ for the purchase of replacement limbs.”);
Buccafusco, supra note 21 (manuscript at 9–13).
28 Buccafusco, supra note 21 (manuscript at 9); see also Stephen Mihm, “A Limb Which Shall
Be Presentable in Polite Society”: Prosthetic Technologies in the Nineteenth Century, in
ARTIFICIAL PARTS, PRACTICAL LIVES: MODERN HISTORIES OF PROSTHETICS 282–83 (Katherine
Ott et al., eds., 2002).
29 LINKER, supra note 21, at 98–99; Buccafusco, supra note 21 (manuscript at 11).
30 LINKER, supra note 21, at 98–99; Buccafusco, supra note 21 (manuscript at 12).
31 WILLIAMSON, supra note 24, at 33–35; Buccafusco, supra note 21 (manuscript at 13–14).
32 WILLIAMSON, supra note 24, at 33–35; Buccafusco, supra note 21 (manuscript at 13).
33 Buccafusco, supra note 21 (manuscript at 14); Mary Tremblay et al., When Elevators Were
for Pianos: An Oral History Account of the Civilian Experience of Using Wheelchairs in Canadian
Society. The First Twenty-Five Years: 1945-1970, 20 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 103, 107 (2005)
(“Hand-controls for automobiles were developed specifically for WW II veterans in 1945 by
automobile companies. Production ceased once the veterans’ needs had been met. Civilians worked
directly with mechanics to develop and install their own designs.”).
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productivity.34 Already, 3D printing and artificial intelligence are further
expanding the range of assistive technologies for people with disabilities.
Social welfare payments that allow beneficiaries to use the funds as
they choose, like the SSI and SSDI benefits subject to the proposed
rulemaking, enable people with disabilities to purchase assistive
technologies beyond mobility aids and medical equipment. This buying
power creates innovation incentives that benefit not only people with
disabilities, but also people without disabilities and businesses and
entrepreneurs across a variety of industries. Many common products and
technologies started as assistive technologies for people with
disabilities.35 For example, the speech-to-text and voice recognition
capabilities now standard in smartphones got their starts as software to
assist people with a variety of disabilities.36 The Segway, now a common
vehicle for police departments, security guards, and city tourists, started
as a mobility aid (and is still popular as such, including among veterans
who have lost one or both legs).37 Eye-gaze-tracking technology that
originated to facilitate communication by people with paralysis is now a
central component of marketing analytics in e-commerce and has been
used to develop new safety features in luxury automobiles.38 Finally,
OXO Good Grips kitchen utensils were originally designed to make
cooking easier for people with disabilities such as arthritis, but are now
enjoyed by a wide variety of consumers, with and without disabilities,
who find the large grips improve the experience of cooking.39
The SSA’s analysis of the costs of implementing the proposed rule
changes completely ignores the costs of losing the demand-side design
incentives generated by SSI and SSDI payments, the resulting
opportunity costs to disabled and nondisabled people who will be without
technological innovations that make their lives easier, and the costs to
businesses in losing a significant sector of their market.40 Further, the
proposed rules ignore the fact that SSI and SSDI payments give people
with disabilities the financial means to purchase assistive technology
necessary to facilitate their return to the workforce. Accordingly, the
proposed rules undermine their own fundamental goals. Because the
34 E.g., Charlotte Hilton Anderson, 21 of the Best-Selling Assistive Devices You can Buy on
Amazon (Nov. 20, 2018, 8:34 AM), https://creakyjoints.org/living-with-arthritis/best-sellingassistive-devices [https://perma.cc/5G5P-SP5J].
35 Nicholas Steenhout, The Evolution of Assistive Technology into Everyday Products, PART
OF A WHOLE, https://incl.ca/the-evolution-of-assistive-technology-into-everyday-products [https://
perma.cc/UWB6-X69A].
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Buccafusco, supra note 21 (manuscript at 42).
40 Rules Regarding the Frequency and Notice of Continuing Disability Reviews, 84 Fed. Reg.
63588, 63596 (proposed Nov. 18, 2019) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 406).
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proposed rules will be bad for people with disabilities, bad for people
without disabilities, and bad for the economy, we urge the SSA to not
adopt the proposed amendments to the SSA rules.

